Abstract-QUIC is a secure transport protocol that improves the performance of HTTPS. An initial QUIC handshake that enforces a strict validation of the client's source address requires two round-trips. In this work, we extend QUIC's address validation mechanism by an out-of-band validation token to save one round-trip time during the initial handshake. The proposed token allows sharing an address validation between the QUIC server and trusted entities issuing these tokens. This saves a roundtrip time for the address validation. Furthermore, we propose distribution mechanisms for these tokens using DNS resolvers and QUIC connections to other hostnames. Our proposal can save up to 50% of the delay overhead of an initial QUIC handshake. Furthermore, our analytical results indicate that 363.6 ms in total can be saved for all connections required to retrieve an average website, if a round-trip time of 90 ms is assumed.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the design of the QUIC protocol [1] , which is currently standardized. It is a secure transport protocol designed to replace TLS over TCP within the upcoming HTTP/3 version. As the world wide web is closely tied to the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and the standardization work on QUIC receives widespread support, we expect the QUIC protocol to be widely deployed on the Internet within the forthcoming years.
The majority of web traffic consists of short-lived connections, for which the connection establishment represents a significant delay overhead [2] . QUIC's initial handshake requires two round trips to establish the connection. One round-trip accounts for the cryptographic connection establishment and the other for a challenge-response mechanism known as stateless retry, which validates the source address claimed by the client to prevent IP spoofing attacks. Moreover, QUIC provides zero round-trip time handshakes for resumed sessions. This allows clients to send encrypted requests directly without waiting for the server's first handshake messages.
To further improve the performance of QUIC's initial handshake, we propose a mechanism to save one additional round trip by outsourcing the address validation mechanism.
To illustrate the basic idea, we assume a website (google.com) that trusts a DNS resolver (Google DNS) to issue address validation tokens. Thus, if a client resolves google.com at Google DNS, it also retrieves an opaque token encoding its publicly visible source address. Subsequently, the client includes this out-of-band validation token in its connection request sent to google.com. Later, the web server validates that the presented token matches the claimed source address of the client. If so, the address validation is completed and in total, a round-trip time has been saved.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose out-of-band validation tokens that enable a shared address validation between a QUIC server and trusted entities issuing such tokens.
• We propose mechanisms to distribute out-of-band validation tokens via DNS resolvers and other QUIC connections.
• We demonstrate the performance improvements gained by out-of-band validation tokens. Our results indicate that our proposal saves up to 50% of the delay overhead of initial QUIC connection establishments. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II introduces the proposed out-of-band validation token. Evaluation results are presented in Section III. Related Work is reviewed in Section IV and Section V concludes the paper.
II. OUT-OF-BAND VALIDATION TOKEN
This section introduces the out-of-band validation token for the QUIC protocol. Subsequently, distribution mechanisms for such out-of-band tokens are proposed using DNS resolvers and QUIC connections to other hostnames.
A. Token design
Address validation tokens present a defense mechanism against source address spoofing by malicious clients. For this purpose, the QUIC server compares the claimed client address with the previously observed source address encoded in the presented token. So far, only QUIC servers themselves can issue address validation tokens for their connections. Out-ofband validation tokens extend this mechanism by allowing external entities to issue these tokens.
To generate these out-of-band tokens for arbitrary client's, the QUIC server is required to share instructions and a secret key with the corresponding external entity. Upon receiving an out-of-band token, the client imports it in its cache, marks it as received in an out-of-band situation, and associates the QUIC server's hostname to it. To establish a fresh connection to the respective hostname, the client includes a cached token in the send initial packet. If the client's cache contains several tokens, the client must prefer the usage of validation tokens received by the QUIC server itself over cached out-of-band tokens. The server may share different secret keys with different external entities. This approach allows a selected invalidation of tokens that have been issued using a specific secret key. Thus, the QUIC server can revoke the secret key provided to an external entity if, e.g., a large number of unrequited connection requests is observed that use tokens issued by the same key. If a setup with dedicated secret keys per external entity is deployed, it is recommended to attach an identifier to the token, that indicates which key was used to generate the specific token.
Note, that according to the draft of IETF QUIC [1] the server treats an invalid token as if the client did not present a token. Thus, the number of required round-trips during the connection establishment is identical if the client presents an invalid out-of-band token or the client's connection request does not contain a token at all.
B. Token distribution mechanisms
To substantiate the real-world benefit of out-of-band tokens, we present in this section two distribution mechanisms for such tokens. First, we introduce the distribution via the Domain Name System (DNS). Then, we describe a distribution mechanism using QUIC connections to other hostnames for this purpose. a) Distribution via DNS resolver: To save a round-trip time via the proposed out-of-band tokens, the client needs to receive the token before sending the connection request to the corresponding QUIC server. Furthermore, clients query a domain name to look up the source address before they send their connection request. Thus, DNS seems to be a suitable place to distribute out-of-band tokens as the connection request often directly follows the corresponding DNS lookup. Figure 1 provides a schematic of this proposed distribution mechanism. This proposal is not limited to a specific DNS standard and can be applied to the traditional DNS and newer versions deploying transport encryption such as DNS over Transport Layer Security (DOT) and DNS over HTTPS (DOH). In general, the DNS protocol needs to be extended by a new record type, which we define as QUICTOKEN.
If the client wishes to establish a fresh QUIC connection to a domain name for which it has not a cached token for future connections available, it queries the domain name (including the QUICTOKEN record type) as shown in Figure 1 resolver proceeds with the default resolution of the source address associated with the domain name. Additionally, if the DNS resolver supports the record type QUICTOKEN and is capable to generate valid out-of-band tokens for this queried domain name, it can include such a token in the response sent to the client.
Note, that to construct valid out-of-band tokens, the resolver needs to be trusted by the server hosting the specific domain name. Thus, the respective server operator shared in advance the instructions and the secret keys required to generate valid tokens for this domain. Upon receiving the source address and the token, the client constructs its QUIC connection request and attach the obtained out-of-band token to it before sending it to the received server source address. Subsequently, the server validates the presented token and proceeds with its normal connection establishment.
To ensure that clients do not reuse tokens across different connections, it is required that the record type QUICTOKEN must not be cached except by the client. This can be realized by setting the Time to Live (TTL) of the QUICTOKEN record type to zero seconds. Note, that this configuration of QUICTOKEN does not affect the caching mechanisms of for example A or AAAA record types.
A limitation of this distribution mechanism arises if the DNS resolver is located within the same private network as the client. In this case, the client's source address as seen by the DNS resolver might mismatch the publicly visible source address as seen by the QUIC server. Thus, the address validation is likely to fail because the source address encrypted in the token does not match the claimed source address as observed by the QUIC server. This issue can be solved by for example moving the DNS resolver to a public IP address or using STUN [3] to learn the client's public source address.
b) Distribution via other QUIC connections: This distribution mechanism assumes that the client first establishes a QUIC connection to hostname A before it sends a connection request to hostname B. Furthermore, we assume that hostname B allows hostname A to issue valid out-of-band tokens for its service and therefore shares instructions and its secret key required to construct these tokens for arbitrary source addresses. We propose a new EXTERNAL TOKEN frame for the QUIC protocol, which allows QUIC servers to provide clients with out-of-band tokens for arbitrary hostnames. However, tokens for future connections to the same hostname A should use the existing NEW TOKEN frame. Note, that tokens for future connections are regarded as trustworthy as they are issued by the same server which is also consuming them. However, outof-band tokens are not treated as trustworthy because the client does not validate that the entity issuing these tokens is authorized to do so. Compared to the NEW TOKEN frame of the QUIC protocol, tokens received via the EXTERNAL TOKEN frame are only used to establish a fresh connection if the client would otherwise send the connection request without an attached address validation token. Figure 2 shows a schematic of this distribution mechanism. The client has an established QUIC connection to hostname A. Hostname A reasons based upon its provided response, that the client is likely to establish a connection to hostname B. This is for example the case, if the provided response contains a hyperlink to a resource hosted by hostname B. To speed up this connection establishment between the client and hostname B, hostname A decides to provide an out-of-band token for the client's source address valid for hostname B.
Upon receiving this EXTERNAL TOKEN frame from hostname A, the client checks first if it has a token for future connections for hostname B. If not, the client establishes a fresh connection to hostnames B by attaching the received outof-band token to its connection request. Otherwise, the client will prefer to include its cached token for future connections (received in a previous connection to the hostname B) in the connection request to hostname B. Upon receiving the client's connection request, hostname B validates the included address validation token and proceeds with the usual connection establishment.
It seems reasonable to expect that a QUIC server will only issue out-of-band tokens for other hostnames for which it is likely that the client will soon connect to them. Outof-band tokens should have an expiration mechanism, thus received tokens may expire if no connection is established to a corresponding hostname within a short period.
III. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal, we evaluate and discuss aspects of its performance, security.
A. Performance
In this section, we present a performance evaluation for outof-band tokens. First, we describe our results with respect to the establishment of a single QUIC connection. Subsequently, we evaluate the performance impact of our proposal on an average website visit. a) Benefits for single connections: Using an out-of-band token to validate the client's source address saves a round-trip compared to using QUIC's stateless retry mechanism. As the QUIC protocol is still work in progress, only experimental implementations of its design exist. Thus, we will use an analytical model to approximate the performance benefit of our proposal on the delay overhead of the connection establishment. For this evaluation, we approximate the delay overhead for the initial connection establishment as shown in Equations 1 and 2. Here, t Default and t Proposal indicate the delay overhead for the current status quo and our proposal, respectively. Furthermore, RTT denotes the round-trip time between both peers and t proc marks the total time required by the peers to process the connection establishment.
Within our analytical model, we assume that the processing of the connection setup t proc takes 40 ms independent of the round-trip time. We chose 40 ms because this approximates the time by the TLS 1.3 over TCP protocol stack for a similar task [6] . Figure 3 plots the delay overhead of the initial handshake over the round-trip time for our analytical model. We find, that the green, dashed line indicating our proposal provides significantly better results than QUIC's status quo marked by a red, dotted plot. The performance improvement achieved by our proposal depends on the RTT. Assuming a transatlantic connection with a round-trip time of 90 ms [7] , we find that a connection establishment using our proposal requires only 60% of the default delay overhead. Furthermore, we derive from Equation 1 and 2 that our proposal reduces the investigated delay overhead by 50% when RTT converges to infinity.
b) Gains for web browsing: As the QUIC protocol will be a building block of the upcoming HTTP/3 network protocol, it seems interesting to evaluate the performance impact of our proposal on website retrieval. A recent study reported, that the retrieval of popular websites requires on average 20.24 encrypted connections to different hostnames [6] . For this evaluation, we assume that all of these hostnames support the QUIC protocol and that they all enable the client's DNS resolver to issue out-of-band tokens. Thus, we find that we can save a round-trip time during each connection establishment if the corresponding web server enforces a strict source address validation before proceeding with the cryptographic handshake.
Furthermore, it is found by [6] , that the average popular website requires up to 4.04 sequentially established connections. This finding can be attributed to the fact, that a retrieved web resource often triggers the establishment of additional connections to retrieve further resources. Thus, saving a roundtrip time via the proposed out-of-band tokens allows in total to save on average 4.04 round-trips until all required connections are established. Assuming a round-trip time of 90 ms, as it is typical for transatlantic connections [7] , we find that 363.6 ms can be saved until the last connection for retrieving the website is established.
B. Security
In this section, we review possible security concerns with respect to out-of-band validation tokens. First, we address the impact of our proposal on the mitigation of Denial-of-Service attacks. Then, we look at risks arising from using address validation tokens from possibly unauthorized origins.
a) Denial-of-Service attacks: By sharing the instructions and the secret keys to generate address validation tokens with other entities, the risk that this confidential information gets compromised increases. In case of a compromise, an adversary can issue tokens for arbitrary source addresses. Thus, the adversary can send connection requests with a spoofed source address to the QUIC server, that contain a valid token for the claimed address. As a result, the server experiences a large number of spoofed connection requests that consume its available resources up to a Denial-of-Service attack. To mitigate such an event, the server should monitor connection requests associated with trusted secret keys. If the number of spoofed connection requests exceeds a threshold, the server revokes that specific secret key to mitigate Denialof-Service attacks. After such a revocation all tokens issued by this key are treated as invalid. However, the revocation of a secret key might also cause a stateless retry for legitimate connection requests and thus causes a performance degradation for these connection attempts. To address this security versus performance tradeoff, it is advised to provide different secret keys to different entities. Thus, a revoked key affects only validation tokens expected to be issued by a specific entity. In total, key revocation provides an effective mechanism to protect against the considered Denial-of-Service attacks.
b) Unauthorized origins: In our proposal, the client does not validate whether an external entity is authorized by the affected QUIC server to issue out-of-band tokens. Thus, it is necessary to review the case in which an unauthorized external entity issues invalid out-of-band tokens. The draft of IETF QUIC [1] instructs that servers treat invalid tokens (for future connections) as if the client did not present a token at all. Therefore, the client experiences no drawbacks by presenting an invalid out-of-band validation token and in total, the client does achieve the same performance as including no token in the connection request. However, if the client has a valid token for future connections and an invalid out-of-band token from an unauthorized origin in its cache, then only a connection request including the token for future connections can save a round-trip during the address validation. Concluding, tokens for future connections are more trustworthy, as they have been retrieved via an authenticated connection to the respective QUIC server. For this reason, the usage of tokens for future connections should be preferred over out-of-band validation tokens because clients do not validate that a trust-relation between the entity issuing the out-of-band tokens and the QUIC server consuming them exists. However, out-of-band tokens are preferential compared to using no token at all, as they can reduce the delay overhead of the connection establishment by up to a round-trip time but always achieve at least the performance of a handshake without a token.
IV. RELATED WORK Performance improvements of the QUIC protocol with respect to the performance penalty caused by a stateless retry are actively discussed within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) QUIC working group. So far, these discussions focus on extending the number of entities that are allowed to issue address validation tokens for other hostnames either based on existing TLS trust-relations [5] or based on the source address from which a respective hostname is served [4] .
This work extends the applicability of the related work because clients can use out-of-band tokens upon the first connection request to any QUIC server, assuming that their DNS resolver is capable to provide a corresponding token. Thus, this proposal outperforms the related work by saving up to 100% of the stateless retries usually required if a strict source address validation is enforced.
V. CONCLUSIONS This paper proposes out-of-band validation tokens for a shared address validation between a QUIC server and trusted entities issuing these tokens. Our evaluation indicates, that the proposed tokens enable significant performance gains for clients and servers without affecting the user's privacy and communication security.
